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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,:
v.

:

RICHARD S. JOHNSON,

:

Case No. 860041

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a conviction of first degree murder
after a trial in the Second District Court.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-22(3) (h) (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of a

criminal conspiracy relating to the distribution of cocaine?
2.

Did the trial court err in not granting defendant's

motion to dismiss the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain?
3.

Should the trial court have given defendant's

requested jury instruction on reasonable doubt?
4.

Did the trial court err in giving the state's

requested jury instruction on the lesser included offense of
second degree murder?
5.

Did the state present sufficient evidence to

convict defendant of first degree murder?
6.

Did the prosecutor misstate evidence in his closing

argument such that defendant was prejudiced?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
Rule 801, Utah R. of Evid. provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.
statement is not hearsay if:
•

A

• • •

(2) Admission by party-opponent. the
statement is offered against a party and is
• • • (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Richard S. Johnson, was charged by
information with one count of first degree murder, a capital
felony, under Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (Supp. 1987) (R. 1 ) .
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged (R.
193).

Once a penalty hearing had been completed, Judge Roth

sentenced defendant to life in prison (R. 134).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In November, 1985 the defendant, Randy Johnson, Brook
Evertson, and Scott Taren met to discuss the formation of a
cocaine distribution business (R. 437, 440). The victim, Piti
Srisi-Ad would pick up the cocaine, the defendant and Randy would
distribute it and Brook would put up the money (R. 441). Randy
distributed cocaine to David Wardrop until approximately
December, 1985 (R. 401). Between December, 1985 and May, 1986
Randy distributed cocaine to John Montoya who distributed it to
David among other people (R. 352)•
During this time period defendant was also interested
in opening a body shop wherein Piti would be working with
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defendant painting cars (R. 277) .

Defendant took out a life

insurance policy on Piti in the amount of $100,000 and in
January, 1986 changed the amount to $200,000 (R. 279)•

Defendant

purchased the policy to protect defendant's interest in the drug
business and his body shop.
In February, 1986 defendant started to have problems
with Piti.

Piti refused to distribute cocaine to defendant (R.

403); defendant thought Piti was a "narc" (R. 468, 484, 589); and
defendant claimed that Piti owed him money (R. 356, 444, 483,
520).

As a result of these problems and the large amount of life

insurance defendant had on Piti, defendant attempted to hire Brad
Bromage and Lloyd Averett to kill Piti (R. 522, 575). Defendant
offered Bromage $10,000, a quarter pound of cocaine, and a job
with defendant's business if Bromage would kill Piti (R. 522).
Defendant offered to pay Averett $6000, a quarter pound of
cocaine, and a corvette if he killed Piti (R. 576).
When it became clear that Averett and Bromage would not
kill Piti, defendant offered Jim Smith $3,000, a quarter pound of
cocaine, a new house, a customized corvette worth approximately
$45,000, and part of defendant's business to kill Piti (R. 731,
785).

Defendant also told Smith that if he did not kill Piti

that Smith and his family would be killed (R. 637).
Additionally, defendant stated that he wanted Piti killed by May
16, 1987 (R. 641).
On the night of May 15, 1986, Piti and approximately
five other people were at Kevin Wakely's house in Ogden, Utah
smoking marijuana (R. 646) •

Piti indicated that he knew where he
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could purchase an ounce of cocaine and Jim Smith stated that he
also knew where cocaine could be purchased (R. 647). Smith used
this information as a ploy to get Piti into Smith's car (R. 647).
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on May 16, 1986 Piti and
Smith left Wakely's house to make the purchase (R. 648). Smith
stopped at a stop sign and when Piti looked away from Smith,
Smith shot Piti in the head instantly killing him (648).

Smith

subsequently dropped Piti's body on Larson Lane in Ogden (R. 245,
649) .
Smith was subsequently arrested for the murder of Piti
(R. 655). Initially, Smith told the officers that Brad Bromage
and Lloyd Averett were responsible for the murder and that Smith
was merely a passenger in the car (R. 656). After consulting
with his attorney, Smith stated that defendant had hired Smith to
kill Piti (R. 656) •
At trial, the jury found defendant guilty of one count
of capital murder.
life sentence.

After a penalty hearing, the judge returned a

Other pertinent facts are found in the argument

portion of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a
criminal conspiracy.

The majority of the testimony pertaining to

the conspiracy was based upon observations of the witnesses and
statements made by defendant and thus was not true hearsay.
Additionally, the evidence was relevant to prove defendant's
motive in wanting the victim killed.
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It was not reversible error for the trial court to deny
defendants motion to dismiss the aggravating circumstance of
pecuniary gain on the ground that an accomplice instruction was
not given.

Arguably, an accomplice instruction to the jury was

not necessary since § 76-5-202 does not require by definition
that defendant actually pull the trigger causing the death of the
victim.

In any event, since the jury found by special verdict

that defendant was also guilty of another aggravating
circumstance not challenged by defendant, this Court need not
address the pecuniary gain circumstance.
No error occurred when the lower court refused to give
defendant's requested instruction on reasonable doubt. The
instructions given accurately stated the law and did not deny
defendant due process.
Because all of the various degrees of homicide have the
relationship of greater and lesser offenses, the lower court did
not err when it gave the state's requested instruction on second
degree murder.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict,
sufficient evidence was presented to show that defendant hired
James Smith to kill the victim.
No prosecutorial error warranting reversal.

First, it

is not clear that the prosecutor misstated evidence presented at
trial*

Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor did misstate the

evidence the jury was instructed that his closing argument was
not evidence in the case. Additionally, there is no indication
that the jury was so prejudiced that there would have been a more
favorable result absent the misstatement.
-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
TESTIMONY OF A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.
Defendant claims the lower court erred in admitting
evidence of a criminal conspiracy to sell drugs involving
defendant, the victim, and other participants pursuant to Utah R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(e) (1987).

First, defendant complains the state

failed to introduce independent evidence of a criminal conspiracy
and thus under State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986) the
testimony of a conspiracy was inadmissible.

Second, defendant

claims that the evidence was not relevant.
It is well established that this Court should not
"disturb the ruling of the trial court on questions of
admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears that the
lower court was in error."

State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-

209 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted).

This Court has stated that

"[t]he trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will
not be reversed absent a showing that the trial court so abused
its discretion as to create a likelihood that injustice
resulted."

State v. Royball. 710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985).
This Court has stated that:
To utilize the exception, [Utah R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(E)] the State must introduce
evidence independent and exclusive of the
conspirator's hearsay statements themselves,
showing the existence of a criminal joint
venture and the defendant's participation
therein. Independent evidence of the
declarant's membership in the criminal
venture is also required. 'Otherwise,
hearsay would lift itself by its own
bootstraps to the level of competent
evidence'•
-6-

State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313f 1318 (Utah 1986) (citations
omitted).
However, this exception is applicable only to out-ofcourt statements by a co-conspirator, and not to the recounting
of observations of a co-conspirator.

As this Court stated in

Gray, "the circumstances surrounding these transactions was
clearly a recounting of what Imani herself had observed and not
what she had heard."

!£. at 1316.

In this case, many of the witnesses testified to their
own observations and to defendants statements regarding a drug
conspiracy.

John Montoya testified that he received deliveries

of cocaine from the group composed of "Pete, Rick, Randy, and
Scott," and that the group was involved in the distribution of
cocaine (R. 351-53).

Scott Taren testified to a meeting he

observed and participated in wherein Rick Johnson and Randy
Johnson would distribute cocaine, Brook Evertson would put up the
money, and Scott would keep the books (R. 437-441).

Randy

Johnson testified he and the victim persuaded defendant to give
them money to start a drug business, and that defendant did give
Randy $5,000 to buy cocaine (R. 925-26).

All of this testimony

was not composed of hearsay statements by coconspirators but
instead detailed statements made by defendant and observations of
the witnesses.

Finally, defendant admitted being involved in a

conspiracy to sell cocaine (R. 467, 1223-24).
difficult to s4e how he can claim error.
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Thus, it is

Second, defendant contends that the hearsay evidence as
to the conspiracy was irrelevant.

In this case, the victim had

the drug connection for the conspiracy; defendant and other
participants in the conspiracy would give money to the victim
with the expectation that he would purchase the cocaine (R. 376,
443).

As a result of the cocaine business, the victim owed

defendant money which the victim never spent on cocaine (R. 356,
483, 520, 1385).

Defendant was also concerned that the victim

was terminating his supply of cocaine to the defendant (R. 403)•
Additionally, defendant indicated that he thought the victim was
a "narc" (R. 484, 589) and therefore, he could ruin the cocaine
business.

Finally, defendant attempted to get all participants

involved in the cocaine business to obtain life insurance
policies (R. 1195), and defendant paid the premiums on the
victim's insurance policy (R. 1207).

It is clear from the

evidence offered to establish a conspiracy that the victim's drug
contact and involvement in the cocaine business was relevant in
establishing defendant's motive for having the victim killed.
The evidence establishing a conspiracy laid the ground work for
why defendant hired Smith to kill Piti and what defendant had to
gain by the death.
Even assuming the offered evidence was improperly
admitted because it was inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant,
defendant has failed to prove any prejudice.

Utah R. Evid. 103

(1986) provides in part that "error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected . . . ."

-8-

Error is reversible only

if a review of the record persuades the court that without the
error there was "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant."

State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048

(Utah 1984)(citations omitted).

Because defendant admitted being

involved in the cocaine business and sufficient evidence was
introduced to prove that he hired Smith to murder Piti any error
was harmless and would not have resulted in a different verdict.
POINT II
NO ERROR OCCURRED IN THE TRIAL COURT'S
FAILURE TO DISMISS THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE CHARGED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
S 76-5-202(f).
Defendant was charged with first degree murder as
follows:
Said defendant intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of Piti Srisa-Ad under the
following circumstances:
(a) The defendant committed, or engaged or
employed another person to commit the
homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract
for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration for commission of the homicide.
(b) The homicide was committed for
pecuniary or other personal gain.
(R. 1 ) .
At trial, defendant moved to dismiss the aggravating
circumstance that the homicide was committed for pecuniary or
other personal gain.

The following exchange took place:

MR. PERKINS: Yes, your Honor. If
the Court please, Mr. Johnson is charged
under two different sections, statutes, under
76-5-202. They have, according to the
Information, they have under category A, the
defendant committed or engaged or employed
another person to commit the homicide
pursuant to an agreement or contract for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration
for commission of the homicide.
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Then they have a second one. They
have the homicide was committed for pecuniary
or other personal gain.
Now as a prerequisite, both of them,
said Defendant intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of Piti Srisi-Ad under the
following circumstances. At this point in
time, under the second predicate, B, that I
have made reference to, there is anything but
a showing that Mr. Johnson did anything to
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of
Piti Srisi-Ad with a homicide being committed
for pecuniary or personal gain. That is a
causal relationship that he intentionally or
knowingly caused. The evidence is contrary
to Rick Johnson having intentionally or
knowingly caused the death for the pecuniary
or personal gain from Rick Johnson.
Therefore, I think to carry forward with subsection B, is inappropriate. That particular
provision should be stricken.
That the only remaining issue would
be that under issue A regarding whether or
not it was basically a contract for hire. I
think that's the only issue that fits into
the knowingly and intentionally. And
therefore we move to dismiss paren B from the
Information.
THE COURT: Motion is denied. The
evidence at this point would support a
finding that the defendant hired somebody to
cause the death of the victim for pecuniary
gain, being to collect the insurance.
(R. 825-26).
Defendant now claims on appeal that since he did not
actually kill the victim, that he could not be found guilty of a
homicide committed for personal gain without an accomplice
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instruction to the jury 1 .
Arguably, an accomplice
this case.

instruction was unnecessary in

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) provides that

"Iclriminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if
the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another
under any of the following circumstances . . . •"

Utah Code Ann.

S 76-2-103 (1978) defines intentionally and knowingly as follows:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to result of his conduct, when it
is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to this conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result.
Nothing in either the definition of first degree murder or
intentionally or knowingly requires that the defendant actually
commit the act which results in the homicide.

All that is

required is that defendant has a "conscious objective" or "is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain" to "cause the
result

(the homicide)."

x

Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1978) is the pertinent statute
regarding criminal responsibility for the conduct of another.
This statute provides:
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for
direct commission of offense or for conduct
of another.—Every person, acting with the
mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits this offense,
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages,
or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a party
for such conduct.
-11-

In this case, the defendant intended to cause Piti's
death by hiring Smith to kill Piti.

Defendant's actions in

hiring Smith was a direct cause of Piti's death.

But for

defendant's actions, Piti would not have been killed.

Simply

because defendant did not pull the trigger, defendant's hiring of
Smith was the cause of the death and defendant is just as guilty
as if he did pull the trigger.

Under this theory, no accomplice

instruction was necessary.
In any event, this Court need not reach the issue of
whether an accomplice instruction was necessary since the jury
also found that defendant was guilty of first degree murder under
an additional aggravating circumstance not challenged by the
defendant.

The jury specifically found that the defendant

"engaged or employed another person to commit the homicide
pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide" (R. 193).
Because of this finding by the jury, this Court may affirm the
verdict without addressing the issue of whether an accomplice
instruction should have been given on the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance.

State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307

(Utah 1986) .

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT REFUSED
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTION ON REASONABLE DOUBT.
At trial, the following instructions on reasonable
doubt were given to the jury:
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Instruction No. 11
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof that satisfies the mind and
convinces the understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it. It
must arise from the evidence or lack of
evidence in the case.
Iff after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence, you can
honestly say that you are not satisfied of
the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable
doubt; but if, after such impartial
consideration and comparison of all the
evidence, you can truthfully say that you
have an abiding conviction of the defendant's
guilt such as you would be willing to act
upon in the more weighty and important
matters relating to your own affairs, you
have no reasonable doubt.
Instruction 12
The law does not require demonstration of
that degree of proof which, exclusing all
possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty, for such degree of proof is rarely
possible. Only that degree of proof is
necessary which convinces the mind and
directs and satisfies the conscience of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
(R. 147, 148) .
Defendant objects to instruction #12 claiming that it
•unfairly clarifies reasonable doubt in favor of the prosecution
as it is slanted toward conviction and not acquittal because
there is not a corresponding clause as to when the 'doubt' is not
enough."

(R. 1660, Br. of App. at 25). To balance instruction

#12 defendant requested the following instruction:
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows:
It is not a mere possible doubt, because
everything relating to human affairs, and
depending on moral evidence is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. It is the state
of the case which after the entire comparison
and consideration of all of the evidence
leaves the mind of the Jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an
-13-

abiding conviction to a moral certainty of
the truth of the charge.
(R. 1661)*

The trial court refused to give defendants requested

instruction (R. 1732).
This Court has stated that where a requested
instruction is deniedf no prejudicial error occurs if it appears
that the giving of the instruction would not have affected the
outcome of the trial.

Additionally, a defendant is not entitled

to an instruction which is repetitive of principles stated in
other instructions given to the jury.
P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980).

State v. McCumber. 622

"[T]here is no apparent reason to

mandate that one, and only one, particular instruction be used by
trial judges in conveying to the jury the meaning of that elusive
phrase, 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt.1"

State v. Eagle, 611

P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980).
Defendant correctly cites State v. Wilks. 25 Utah 2d
22, 474 P.2d 733 (1970) for the following proposition:
When instructions are given which clearly
and positively state what must be proved
before a conviction can be had and the jury
told that they must acquit unless each and
every element is established by the evidence
and beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not
necessary to give another instruction in
negative form. . . .
Id. at 735.

Defendant however claims that MlKs. is

distinguishable from the instant case because "when instruction
Number 12 was given, there were then two instructions to the
positive and only one to the negative now unfairly weighing
•reasonable doubt1 to the prejudice of the defendant."
App. at 28) •
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(Br. of

Defendant appears to be playing a numbers game with the
court.

At no time does defendant contend that either instruction

#11 or #12 shifted the burden of proof to the defendant or that
the language denied defendant due process. State v. Tillman, 72
Utah Adv. Rep. 6# 20 (Dec, 22f 1987).

Instead defendant contends

that instruction #12 should have been countered with an
instruction slanted towards defendant.
Defendant makes no allegation that if his proposed
instruction had been given the result of the trial would have
been different. Additional instructions stated that the burden
of proof was on the State and that defendant was presumed
innocent unless the State proved all elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt (R. 136, 139). No error occurred in the
denial of the requested instruction.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING AN
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON SECOND DEGREE
MURDER.
Defendant claims that under the ILakei.2 t e s t the
elements of second degree murder were not necessarily included
within the charged offense of first degree murder and thus the
trial court erred in giving an instruction on second degree
murder.

The error from giving such an instruction defendant

claims, is that the jury was prejudiced towards convicting him,
(Br. of App. at 31).

2

State v. Bakerf 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983).
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Under Bj^kfiJLr when the prosecution requests a lesser
included offense instruction then "both the legal elements and
the actual evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those
elements roust necessarily be included within the original charged
Offense."

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983).

"In

other words, an instruction on the lesser offense should be given
at the prosecution's request only if the greater offense could
not be committed without also committing the lesser offense."
State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 n. 5 (Utah 1986).
This Court established in State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527,
530 (Utah 1983) that "all of the various degrees of homicide have
the relationship of greater and lesser included offenses."

This

conclusion is based upon Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402(3)(c) (1978)
which provides that an offense is included when it is
specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included
offense.

This Court concluded in Crick that Utah Code Ann. S 76-

5-201 and the succeeding sections under the heading of "criminal
homicide" (through S 76-5-207) amount to such a designation.
this court stated in CJLicJt:
Section 76-5-201 provides:
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if
he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or
with criminal negligence unlawfully causes
the death of another.
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the
first and second degree, manslaughter or
negligent homicide, or automobile homicide.
In the succeeding sections, the Code sets out
the statutory definitions of the various
types of criminal homicide, each (except for
automobile homicide) in descending order of
seriousness. This structure—notably the
•16-

As

identification of the crime of criminal
homicide and the specification of common
elements in § 76-5-201, and the relationships
inherent in the succeeding sections—fulfills
the S 76-1-402(3)(c) requirement of specific
(statutory) designation of a lesser included
offense. Consequently, all of the various
degrees of homicide have the relationship of
greater and lesser included offenses. • . .
i<&. at 530 (citations omitted) .
Defendant claims that the second degree murder
instruction was improper because if the jury found that defendant
did not hire Smith to kill the victim, and as such was not guilty
of first degree murder, then defendant was innocent of any
wrongdoing (Br. of App. at 30-31) •

Defendant bases his argument

in part upon the evidence presented at trial that Smith, not
defendant, was the one who actually killed the victim.
Defendant's argument is without merit.
First, it is interesting to note that while defendant
argues that he could not be found guilty of second degree murder
because he did not do the actual killing, defendant requested a
lesser included instruction on manslaughter at trial (R. 1663).
Defendant's argument in regards to the second degree murder
instruction is equally applicable to a manslaughter instruction.
Second, assuming the jury found that defendant did not hire Smith
to kill the victim, the jury could still have found that
defendant intentionally or knowingly killed the victim in that
defendant planned and assisted in the murder.

There is no

requirement that defendant actually be present and commit the
homicide.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (Utah 1978).

17-

Based upon the above argument it is clear that the
instruction on second degree murder was proper.

However, even

assuming the instruction was erroneously given, this Court has
stated that "where a jury finds the defendant guilty of a greater
offense, the giving of an erroneous instruction on a lesser
offense is not deemed prejudicial."

State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d

54, 513 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1973).
POINT V
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
Defendant contends that the evidence introduced at
trial was insufficient to convict him of the charged offense.

He

alleges that the only evidence presented at trial linking him
with the murder was that of three known drug dealers who had as
much motive for murdering the victim as defendant had.
This Court has stated:
[W]e Review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
State v. Marcum, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 7 (Jan. 21, 1988)
(citations omitted)•

Additionally, any inconsistencies in

testimony does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict, and go
merely to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses.

Id.* at 7.
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There was sufficient evidence introduced at trial to
convict the defendant.

Defendant argues that the testimony of

Brad Broraage, Lloyd Averrett and Jim Smith is uncorroborated and
illogical.

Lloyd Averrett testified that defendant came to

Averett's house and threatened him and his family (R. 606).
Debra Averrett also testified to defendant threatening her
husband and family (R. 610). Defendant admits going to Lloyd's
home in Clarkston (R. 1140).

Jim Smith's testimony that

defendant was threatening him is corroborated by his wife's
testimony (R. 637). Paulette Smith testified that Jim stated he
did not want to kill Piti (R. 1458).

She also testified that

defendant was frequently at their house before the murder (R.
1457) .
It was apparently common knowledge that defendant had a
falling out with Piti (R. 445). Both Scott Taren and Valerie
Clark testified that defendant was angry with Piti about drugs
(R. 445, 907). Piti owed defendant money in connection with the
drug conspiracy (R. 483). Defendant was capable of killing Piti;
and admited to threatening his own brother with a gun (R. 1235).
He also admits to yelling at and threatening Piti (R. 1235).

He

explains it in a humorous light but admits to both acts.
Defendant also claims that Jim Smith's testimony is
illogical.

Jim Smith first stated that Brad and Lloyd helped him

kill Piti.

The next day however Jim changed his story about the

killing and told his attorney that defendant hired Smith to kill
Piti (R. 716, 719, 788). Defendant also questions the
credibility of Smith's testimony as it relates to the payment
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Smith would receive for killing Piti.
is one for the jury.
was wealthy.

The issue of credibility

Smith could have believed that defendant

Defendant drove a corvette and once asked Paulette

Smith if she would like one (R. 1462).

Sherry Vosper showed Jim

Smith the diamond ring that defendant had given her (R. 468).
Finally, defendant continuously referred to his connections in
Park City as supporting him (R. 635). Jim Smith thought that the
Park City connections were assisting in the payment for Piti's
death (R. 793)•

The evidence when viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdict supports defendant's conviction.
POINT VI
NO PROSECUTORIAL ERROR OCCURRED
WARRANTING A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor misstated in
closing argument the immunity granted to Brad Bromage regarding
the murder, and that this misstatement vested Bromage with
greater credibility as a witness.
Defendant admits that he failed to object to the
alleged misstatement at trial, and absent manifest error he is
barred from raising an argument on appeal not objected to at
trial.

Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1); State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942

(Utah 1982).

In State V. Tillman* 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 1 (Dec.

22, 1987) this Court stated that it would consider all claims
raised in capital cases on appeal even if no proper objection was
made at trial.
The State is of the view that when the sentencing body
has not selected the death penalty this Court*s position on
waiver in capital cases is inapplicable and the general rules
-20-

regarding waiver should be enforced*

Although defendant moved

for a new trial on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct, the
objection to the misstatement was not timely and should not
preserve defendants argument for purposes of appeal*

This Court

made the following statement in Tillman regarding "invited
error":
Indeed, it is the rule that if improper
statements are made by counsel during a
trial, it is the duty of opposing counsel to
register a contemporaneous objection thereto
so that the court may make a correction by
proper instruction and, if the offense is
sufficiently prejudicial, declare a mistrial*
• . . Fairness requires that if defendant
objected to the prosecutor's argument, he,
through his attorney, should have made such
objection known at the earliest opportunity.
Tillman, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13.

Assuming this Court decides to

address the merits of defendant's argument, the following
analysis is provided by the State.
The prosecutor made the following statement in closing
argument:
Brad Bromage, I gave immunity. I brought
him here in the investigative subpoena. You
heard the immunity. You have got immunity on
the death of Piti Srisi-Ad and the drug
dealings you have had, and now you have to
answer my questions. A person can't take the
Fifth Amendment and not answer when I have
granted immunity. You can't incriminate
yourself if I can't charge you. Brad Bromage
could have said I did it, I am the one who
did it. I couldn't have charged him. I have
granted immunity. That's permanent and
lasting.
(R. 1879).

Defendant claims that this statement was erroneous

because Bromage was never granted immunity for the murder, but
only for the drug transactions.

It is unclear from the record
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whether Bromage was granted immunity for the murder.

The

following exchange occurred during direct examination of Bromage*
Q:

Now you have previously been in to
testify I think at the Preliminary
Hearing, and one other investigative
hearing some months ago?

A:

Yes.

Q:

At that point you were granted by myself,
as County Attorney, immunity for your
involvement in drug transactions prior to
May 16th of this year?

A:

Transactional immunity.

Q:

Right, you understand that don't you?

A:

Yes, I do.

Q:

I think Don Sharp was your attorney at
those hearings. He sat through the
Preliminary and also the Investigative
Hearing?

A:

Yes.

Q:

You understand the testimony that you may
give, that gives you—or incriminates you
in your use or selling of drugs can't be
held against you at this point, you
understand that?

A:

It cannot be.

Q:

Right.

A:

Okay, I understand.

Q:

I notice Mr. Sharp isn't here. Is it
your intent to go ahead without his
presence?

A:

Yes, it was.

Q:

Do you have any questions about the
immunity before you go on?

A:

It is total immunity.

Q:

As far as any drug transaction, you can't
be charged with any of those items.
-22-

A:

I can't be charged with anything.

Q:

The things you are testifying about,
that's true. If there are other things
we learn about, we will charge you with
those.

A:

I understand.

(R. 516-17).
In reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct,
this Court:
must determine if the prosecutor's remarks
calls to the attention of the jurors matters
they would not be justified in considering in
reaching the verdict and, if so, whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the
misconduct so prejudiced the jury that there
would have been a more favorable result
absent the misconduct.
State v. Speer. No. 860112 slip op. at 5 (Jan. 26, 1988) citing
State v, Tillman. 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9 (Dec. 22, 1987).

In

determining whether a remark is prejudicial the alleged
misconduct must be viewed in light of the totality of the trial
and the trial court's ruling on this matter will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Speer. No.

860112, slip op. at 5 (January 26, 1988).
This Court has determined that in closing argument a
party has considerable freedom.

"Counsel for both sides have

considerable latitude in their [closing] arguments to the jury;
they have a right to discuss fully from their standpoints the
evidence and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom."
State V> Lafferty, No. 20740 slip op. at 25 (Jan. 11, 1988)
citing State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426
(1973) .
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In this case no error occurred*

Firstf it is not clear

the prosecutor called attention of the jurors to matters outside
of the record.

Bromage stated on the record that he understood

that he could not be charged with anything and the prosecutor
confirmed that he could not be charged with anything he testified
about, which would include the murder (R. 517).
Even assuming that Bromage was not granted immunity for
the murder, defendant provides no analysis that the misstatement
so prejudiced the jury that there was a strong likelihood of a
more favorable verdict absent the misstatement.

The jurors were

instructed that argument by the attorneys was not evidence in the
case:
Instruction No. 18
Statements and arguments of counsel are
not evidence in the case. When, however, the
attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree as
to the existence of a fact, the jury must,
unless otherwise instructed, accept the
stipulation and regard that fact as proved.
Unless you are otherwise instructed, the
evidence in the case always consists of the
sworn testimony of the witnesses, regardless
of who may have called them; and all exhibits
received in evidence, regardless of who may
have produced them; and all facts which may
have been admitted or stipulated.
Any evidence as to which an objection was
sustained by the Court, and any evidence
ordered stricken by the Court, must be
entirely disregarded.
Unless you are otherwise instructed,
anything you may have seen or heard outside
of the courtroom is not evidence, and must be
entirely disregarded.
(R. 154).
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The prosecutorfs statement regarding credibility of
Bromage is confusing at best*

Assuming, as defendant argues,

that Bromage was not granted immunity for the murder, the jury
would have been aware of that fact and taken it into account when
judging his credibility, i.e. that he was lying to cover up for
his illegal conduct.

On the other hand, assuming that Bromage

was given immunity for the murder this fact in the minds of most
jurors would make him a less credible witness, since he would be
testifying only because of the grant of immunity and was likely
saying what the prosecutor wanted to hear.

In any event, the

prosecutor's statements did not prejudice defendant such that
there was a likelihood of a more favorable result.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments the State requests
this Court to affirm defendants conviction.
DATED this
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day of February, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

KIMBERLY K. HORNAK
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Deirdre A. Gorman, attorney for defendant, 205 26th Street,
Suite 34, Ogden, Utah 84401, this <3&~ day of February, 1988.

•25-

